I am fourth-year graduate student at the University of Connecticut and a member of the Logic Group. In Fall 2018, I’ll be joining the University of Connecticut Humanities Institute as a research assistant.
The majority of my research lies at the intersections of philosophical logic, philosophy of language, and metaphysics. More precisely, my research falls into three main categories:
My default stance in philosophical debates is a pragmatic one: I first look at how we use a word or concept, then I try to give a theory of it. Because of this, I am a methodological pluralist, and I believe that the semantics and metaphysics of truth differs in various domains of inquiry. In truth-conditional semantics, I believe the operative concept is purely logical, allowing for the convenient statements of model-theoretic results about natural language. In our everyday cognitive lives, I believe that truth is a substantive concept with an associated degree-theoretic metaphysics. This has lead me to defend the claims that ‘true’ is a gradable adjective and that the property of truth is non-absolute.
I’m also generally interested in semantics, in particular the semantics of generics and the role of events in semantic theories, social epistemology, and skepticism.
I have links to and descriptions of papers here, descriptions of my teaching style and previous courses here, and a description of some of my non-philosophical interests and hobbies here. My CV can be found here.