Deflating the Determination Argument, pulished in Thought
This article argues for the compatibility of deflationism and truth-conditional semantic theories. I begin by focusing on an argument due to Dorit Bar-On, Claire Horisk, and William Lycan for incompatibility, arguing that their argument relies on an ambiguity between two senses of the expression ‘is at least.’ I go on to show how the disambiguated arguments have different consequences for the deflationist, and argue that no conclusions are established that the deflationist cannot accommodate. I then respond to some objections and gesture at a more general defense of the compatibility claim.
A Neglected QUA-Solution to the Fundamental Problem of Christology (w/ Jc Beall), forthcoming in Faith & Philosophy
We advance a neglected QUA solution to the fundamental problem of Christology. Our chief aim is to put the view on the theological table, leaving future debate to tell its ultimate fate. After presenting the view we measure it against standard problems that confront extant QUA views and also against objections peculiar to the proposed view.
Truth and Gradability
I argue for two claims: that the ordinary English truth predicate is a gradable adjective and that truth is a property that comes in degrees. The first is a semantic claim, motivated by the linguistic evidence and the similarity of the truth predicate’s behavior to other gradable terms. The second is a claim in natural language metaphysics, motivated by interpreting the best semantic analysis of gradable terms as applied to the truth predicate. In addition to providing arguments for these two claims, I draw out consequences for debates about deflationism and truth-based analyses of notions such as assertion and logical consequence. I argue that deflationism is incompatible with the gradability of truth, but that with some minor modifications, degrees of truth theorists can retain standard accounts of assertion and logical consequence, including the full resources of classical logic.